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This paper focuses on hardware/software implementation and ﬂight results relevant to a multi-sensor 
obstacle detection and tracking system based on radar/electro-optical (EO) data fusion. The sensing 
system was installed onboard an optionally piloted very light aircraft (VLA). Test ﬂights with a single 
intruder plane of the same class were carried out to evaluate the level of achievable situational awareness 
and the capability to support autonomous collision avoidance. System architecture is presented and 
special emphasis is given to adopted solutions regarding real time integration of sensors and navigation 
measurements and high accuracy estimation of sensors alignment. On the basis of Global Positioning 
System (GPS) navigation data gathered simultaneously with multi-sensor tracking ﬂight experiments, 
potential of radar/EO fusion is compared with standalone radar tracking. Flight results demonstrate a 
signiﬁcant improvement of collision detection performance, mostly due to the change in angular rate 
estimation accuracy, and conﬁrm data fusion effectiveness for facing EO detection issues. Relative sensors 
alignment, performance of the navigation unit, and cross-sensor cueing are found to be key factors to 
fully exploit the potential of multi-sensor architectures.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Masson SAS. This is an open access article under the CC 
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Safe and eﬃcient integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(UAS) into Civil Airspace is a key challenge for unleashing their po-
tential for non-military applications [1] “without reducing existing 
capacity, decreasing safety, impacting current operators, or plac-
ing other airspace users or persons and property on the ground 
at increased risk” [2]. Integration challenges comprise airworthi-
ness and certiﬁcation, vulnerabilities of command and control link, 
human factors such as crew qualiﬁcations and training, air traﬃc 
management integration, and the lack of a see-and-avoid capability 
similar to manned aircraft. Considering sense and avoid, aeronau-
tical agencies are currently working to detail the signiﬁcance of 
general guidelines such as “equivalent levels of safety must be 
guaranteed with respect to manned aircraft” [3–5]. Following [6], 
in general sense and avoid consists of two components, such as 
separation assurance and collision avoidance. The ﬁrst function re-
duces the probability of a collision by ensuring that the aircraft 
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(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).remain “well clear” of each other thereby assuring safe separa-
tion, while collision avoidance is related to extreme maneuvers 
just prior to closest point of approach to prevent collisions in cases 
where safe separation is lost.
While ground-based sense and avoid is a near term solution 
for meeting requirements thus enabling integration in limited op-
erational areas [2,7], airborne surveillance for separation assurance 
and collision avoidance is the deﬁnite key asset to be accomplished 
and can be performed by two fundamental methods: cooperative 
instruments, wherein an aircraft is equipped with a transponder 
to interrogate and/or broadcast information, and non-cooperative 
sensors, which are able to detect targets autonomously. Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traﬃc Alert and 
Collision Avoidance (TCAS) systems are classiﬁed as cooperative 
systems. In particular, the former is expected to play a key role for 
UAS integration also in the case of small UAS with limited bud-
gets, becoming the primary safety system of autonomous, i.e., not 
dependent on command and control link, or remote pilot-based 
cooperative sense and avoid architectures [6,8,9].
Compared with ADS-B based solutions, non-cooperative archi-
tectures have the great advantage of guaranteeing detection and 
avoidance of non-equipped aircraft, and in the case of air-to-air ra-
dio link loss. However, they represent the most challenging case ss article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
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solutions seem to be achievable in a mid/far term perspective [2]. 
Nevertheless, a signiﬁcant research effort is carried out world-
wide to bridge the gap between existing technology and users 
requirements. Non-cooperative sensing systems are mainly studied 
in view of the collision avoidance function, and the proposed so-
lutions range from standalone electro-optical (EO) sensors [10–13]
to multi-sensor radar/EO systems [14]. Also, integrated architec-
tures comprising radars, optical sensors, and cooperative systems, 
have been developed and tested in ﬂight [15]. Recent efforts have 
been aimed at the development of autonomous collision avoidance 
architectures and algorithms [14–17] and of new radar sensors ex-
plicitly tailored for UAS collision avoidance [18,19].
Within the research project named TECVOL, the Italian Aero-
space Research Center (CIRA) and the University of Naples de-
veloped an autonomous non-cooperative sense and avoid system 
which relies on an integrated radar/electro-optical (EO) conﬁg-
uration [14]. The prototype hardware/software system has been 
installed for ﬂight demonstration onboard an optionally piloted 
laboratory aircraft of ultra light category named FLARE (Flying Lab-
oratory for Aeronautical REsearch), which is a customized TECNAM 
P-92, and a ﬂight test campaign has been carried out with a simi-
lar aircraft acting as intruder.
This work follows previous papers on radar-based detection 
and tracking [20], EO-based obstacle detection within the inte-
grated sensor system [21], and autonomous non-cooperative col-
lision avoidance experiments [22] and its focus is on radar/EO data 
fusion logics, algorithms, and ﬂight results relevant to the achiev-
able situational awareness. The paper is organized as follows. First 
of all, a general discussion is presented about potential beneﬁts in 
adopting a multi-sensor approach for the sense and avoid prob-
lem. Then, after an overview of system architecture, developed 
algorithms are described in detail regarding real time multi-sensor 
tracking and relative sensors alignment. Finally, a thorough analysis 
of ﬂight results relevant to near collision conditions is presented. 
Multi-sensor fusion output is analyzed and compared with stan-
dalone radar tracking especially focusing on the impact of tracking 
accuracy on collision detection reliability. On the basis of this com-
parison, general lessons learned, and considerations on data fusion 
role in the development of future collision avoidance systems, are 
provided.
2. Data fusion for sense and avoid
At a qualitative level [20], a non-cooperative sensing system for 
sense and avoid has to fulﬁll different requirements to guarantee 
an adequate level of safety, such as:
– detection range, that has to allow collision avoidance maneu-
vers to be completed keeping a minimum separation from 
intruders;
– angular ﬁeld of regard, that also impacts obstacle tracking per-
formance during avoidance maneuvers;
– uncertainty in estimating obstacle relative position and ve-
locity, that directly affects collision detection performance in 
terms of false alarm rates and missed detection rates;
– measurement rates and latencies, that have to be adequate 
to provide conﬁrmed detections in a reasonable time, and 
to track relative dynamics in case of maneuvers too, at least 
within certain limits.
Within this framework, the great potential for sense and avoid 
of multi-sensor architectures and real time fusion of measurements 
from heterogeneous sources, derives from the fact that different 
sensors have complementary features in view of the application. 
In fact, airborne radars provide direct and typically accurate range estimates, and also range rate if Doppler processing is used. More-
over, they can guarantee large detection range, low levels of missed 
or false detections (ground echoes have to be properly ﬁltered, 
especially when ﬂying at low altitude [20]), and are not much 
affected by weather conditions (indeed, this depends on the op-
erating frequency [23]). However, standalone radar architectures 
are typically characterized by coarse angular resolutions and low 
update rates, since ﬁner resolution essentially implies larger an-
tenna dimensions, though coherent processing may be employed 
to improve this aspect [18] and electronic scanning allows increas-
ing measurement rate in the case of conﬁrmed tracks [18,19]. In 
general radars are demanding in terms of cost, size, weight and 
required electric power, so that they do not represent an afford-
able sensing solution for small unmanned platforms.
On the other hand, EO sensors offer the potential of highly ac-
curate angular measurements at fast update rates and with limited 
budgets in terms of mass, power, size and cost. Coverage of a wide 
ﬁeld of view can be guaranteed by installing multiple camera sys-
tems [10,13]. In general, EO systems require heavy computational 
resources in order to fulﬁll real-time full image detection of ob-
stacles, and their output can suffer from a high false alarm rate. 
Obviously, optical image arrays are not capable to directly estimate 
range and range rate to obstacle, hence interest for low power 
range measuring sensors, such as laser rangeﬁnders, arises [24,
25]. In theory, multitemporal strategies based on scale change be-
tween consecutive images or ownship maneuvers [26] can allow 
estimating time to collision or range and range rate, but inade-
quate estimation accuracy, short time to collision, and aircraft ma-
neuverability can limit the applicability of these approaches. More 
importantly, EO detection range and reliability can be very much 
affected by illumination and weather conditions, and can be poor.
On the basis of these considerations, it follows that integrated 
radar/EO systems can be a good sensing option to guarantee the 
required situational awareness in the case of medium/large UAS 
platforms, provided that real time data fusion is properly carried 
out. In general, the high level objective of the data fusion system 
is to integrate the best features of the dissimilar sensors while en-
suring solution reliability and limiting the computational burden 
so enabling real time software implementation.
3. Architecture and algorithms
Within project TECVOL, a multi-sensor conﬁguration has been 
selected which comprises an airborne Ka-band pulsed radar, two 
Infra Red (IR) cameras, a high resolution panchromatic camera op-
erating in the visible spectral band and a color camera. In particu-
lar, while the other optical sensors have been used in experiments 
relevant to obstacle identiﬁcation and ﬂight in low visibility con-
ditions, the panchromatic camera has been selected to test data 
fusion for autonomous non-cooperative collision avoidance, in a 
reduced ﬁeld of regard (depending on camera ﬁeld of view). How-
ever, this suﬃces for technology demonstration in quasi frontal 
near collision encounters, which represent the most challenging 
conditions. The sensing system is completed by a CPU devoted to 
image processing, and a CPU devoted to real time tracking. The real 
time tracking unit is connected by a CAN bus to the onboard Flight 
Control Computer that performs autonomous navigation, based on 
different sensors including a commercial-off-the-shelf Attitude and 
Heading Reference System (AHRS) with magnetometers and latest 
generation MEMS-based accelerometers and gyroscopes, and ﬂight 
control including autonomous collision avoidance. The hardware 
architecture of the whole ﬂight system is depicted in Fig. 1. The 
reader is referred to [14,20,21] for further details.
As main features, the adopted data fusion architecture is based 
on the concepts of hierarchy among sensors, central-level fusion 
[27], and cross-sensor cueing [14]. In fact, given the dependency of 
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is used as the main sensor that performs initial detection and 
tracking and determines track status, while the EO sensors in gen-
eral are used as auxiliary information sources to increase accuracy 
and measurement rate. On the other hand, standalone radar track-
ing estimates can be effective in reducing the computation time 
and the false alarm rate of EO image processing. Thus, another im-
portant feature of the developed system is cross-sensor cueing, i.e., 
the exchange of information at sensor level, with the EO system 
that is cued by the tracking module. Cross-sensor cueing allows 
exploiting all the available information at sensor level, establish-
ing a feedback mechanism between data fusion estimates and raw 
detections which can be the real added value of multi-sensor sys-
tems, besides the accuracy increase brought by the combination of 
measurements with different uncertainties.
The selected sensor fusion architecture is central-level: apart 
from pre-processing operations, raw sensor data are combined on 
the basis of their estimated uncertainty in a unique tracking al-
gorithm based on an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) [28], and no 
tracks are generated at sensor level. EKF constitutes a commonly 
used solution for ﬁltering and prediction [15], but other fusion 
algorithms more suited for dealing with non-linear and/or non-
gaussian systems such as the Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF), the 
Particle Filter (PF), and the recently developed Cubature Kalman 
Filter (CKF) [29] could also be used and are under analysis [30]. 
The potential of these approaches in terms of tracking perfor-
mance has to be traded-off against computational burden which 
can hinder real time implementation (especially for PF), though 
the continuous performance improvements of on-board computing 
systems tend to reduce these issues. On the other hand, a key as-
pect to consider is the reliability in different scenarios (possibly 
with a few valid measurements to exploit) without an excessive 
dependence on ad hoc tuning. Of course, multi-sensor systems are 
the best candidate for implementing these techniques because of 
their potential in terms of detection accuracy and measurement 
rate. While a comparative analysis of different ﬁltering schemes is 
beyond the scope of this paper, future works will address these 
topics.The logical architecture of the multi-sensor-based obstacle de-
tection and tracking system is outlined in Fig. 2. The following 
sub-sections focus on challenges and solutions for effective real 
time data fusion, and the ﬂight-based procedure adopted for high 
accuracy sensors’ alignment estimation. The implemented EO ob-
stacle detection algorithm is described in detail in [21].
3.1. Real time multi-sensor tracking
The multi-sensor tracking algorithm enables effective fusion of 
the information provided by the different sensors and allows es-
timating obstacle kinematics. It runs at 10 Hz to properly follow 
ownship dynamics and is based on an EKF with linear dynamic 
model and non-linear measurement equation. The state vector is 
comprised of nine components which are obstacle coordinates in 
NED (North-East-Down reference frame with origin in the aircraft 
center of mass) with their ﬁrst derivatives and the NED compo-
nents of target acceleration. A classical Singer model is used for the 
three acceleration components [31,32] which assumes that every 
component of target acceleration evolves in terms of a correlated 
noise process with given time constant and instantaneous variance, 
i.e., in discrete terms it is modeled as
a(k + 1) = ρma(k) +
√
1− ρ2mσmr(k) (1)
where σ 2m is the acceleration instantaneous variance, μ is the in-
verse of target acceleration time constant, ρm = exp(−μT ) with T
being the sampling interval, and r(k) is a zero-mean unit-standard 
deviation Gaussian random variable [20].
The model is ﬂexible since it is possible to control the ﬁlter 
bandwidth by tuning the process noise matrix. Given the key re-
quirement of tracking reliability, the choice has been to keep a 
relatively large ﬁlter bandwidth to minimize the risk of biases gen-
eration and consequent track loss. Indeed, this increases in some 
way the risk of including EO false alarms within the ﬁltering pro-
cess, with possible bad association and consequent track degra-
dation. Moreover, within the integrated radar/EO system tracking 
reliability can be more severely affected by EO false alarms than 
by missed detections. Thus, a rather conservative tuning of the EO 
obstacle detection algorithms is considered.
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measurement covariance matrices depend not only on radar and 
EO performance but also on AHRS inaccuracies in estimation of 
aircraft attitude angles. Since ﬂight data offer a precise charac-
terization of angular errors in NED (reference given by GPS data 
only) measurement covariance can be estimated using sensor data 
gathered in data collection ﬂights. The impact of attitude measure-
ment errors can be more detrimental for the EO sensors than for 
the radar, since the ﬁner angular resolution can be more signif-
icantly degraded in the process of measurement formulation in 
NED. It is also important to underline that it is mainly the attitude 
measurement noise that impacts measurement covariance, while 
nearly constant errors are less important for collision avoidance 
aspects. Besides attitude measurement uncertainty, measurement 
formulation in NED for EO systems is inﬂuenced by frame rate, 
image timing accuracy, and actual aircraft attitude dynamics.
Track/measurement association is carried out using ellipsoidal 
gating and a centralized statistic [28]. In order to improve EO sen-
sors performance and reliability and to reduce the computational 
load, EO detection process is carried out in a window centered in 
the foreseen intruder position. EO-based detection algorithm takes 
advantage from cross sensor cueing in different ways [21]:
– Center of search window located by coarse estimation of in-
truder line of sight;
– Range based selection of search window dimensions;
– Adoption of range dependent criteria for deﬁning image pro-
cessing thresholds and applying consistency checks on candi-
date measurements.
If the image processing system successfully detects an intruder, 
the EO measurement is used only if satisﬁes the gating process. 
It has to be considered that during radar/EO tracking track covari-
ance is reduced with respect to radar-only tracking, so that false 
alarms are likely to fall outside the gate and in such case are dis-
carded and do not affect track accuracy. Indeed, the risk of EO false 
alarm ﬁltering is higher in the ﬁrst phase of ﬁrm tracking, when 
track covariance is still large because of the radar rough angular 
accuracy.
When considering real time implementation of developed data 
fusion algorithm, important issues are related to proper manage-ment of sensors’ latency and accurate space registration of their 
measurements. While the ﬁrst point is discussed here, the second 
one is analyzed in Subsection 3.2. As documented by the manufac-
turer, radar latency can be at most of the order of 1 s for the con-
sidered settings, and measurement delay is provided by the sensor 
for each detection. Since the tracker works at 10 Hz, in the devel-
oped system a measurement is assigned a time stamp which is the 
nearest time on the tracker 0.1 s scale. Then, to perform gating, 
association and track updating, the solution is to keep in mem-
ory a sliding window where navigation and track data are stored. 
The considered time window dimensions correspond to the largest 
possible radar data latency. This also implies that the maximum 
acceptable latency for the EO system is on the order of 1 s. EO 
latency is computed by the tracking software because both track 
data sent to the image processing unit and the eventual positive 
replies are time-tagged: measurements with larger latency than 1 s 
are automatically discarded. However, image processing latencies, 
estimated ﬁrst in laboratory hardware-in-the-loop [33] and then 
in ﬂight tests, were of the order of 0.1 s at most.
For EO and radar measurements, ﬁltering process consists in 
evaluating ﬁltered state and covariance at measurement time and 
then in modifying current state and covariance on the basis of 
this information, based on the linearity of the tracking ﬁlter [20]. 
In general, latency of EO detection depends on the computational 
load of image processing, while radar delay depends on the in-
truder position in the radar scan volume. As a consequence, when 
both sensors provide reliable detection, it is likely to have out-of-
sequence measurements (OOSM) which is a well known problem 
in real time multi-sensor tracking [28,34]. Due to the operating 
scenario, it is unlikely to have more than one or very few ﬁrm 
tracks, so it is possible to handle OOSM without any approxima-
tion, by using stored track data and re-ﬁltering measurements if 
necessary, since the computational burden is compatible with real 
time implementation. In this way measurements are used as soon 
as possible and at the same time no loss of accuracy is produced. 
From the programming point of view, this means that a sliding 
window is kept in memory also to store sensor measurements for 
possible re-ﬁltering.
A qualitative example of OOSM processing is shown in Fig. 3. 
At a given time, current state and covariance estimates have been 
generated (a). When a delayed EO measurement arrives, state and 
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estimation (the same logic applies to covariance calculations). Colors are used to 
clarify state estimates dependency on sensor measurements. (For interpretation of 
colors in this ﬁgure, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
covariance updates are calculated at measurement time and then 
propagated to the current time (b). If an out-of-sequence radar 
measurement arrives, ﬁrst state and covariance updates are calcu-
lated at radar measurement time and propagated to the EO mea-
surement time (c), then the EO measurement is used again within 
the ﬁltering algorithm, and state and covariance updates are again 
propagated to the current time (d).
3.2. Flight-based relative sensors alignment
In general, a key point for effective sensor fusion is accurate 
spatial registration among the sensors [28]. In the considered sys-
tem, all the EO sensors can be aligned with high accuracy with 
respect to the AHRS by means of a ground procedure based on car-
rier phase differential GPS measurements, own EO image process-
ing, and least squares optimization [35] which permits to attain an 
rms alignment accuracy on the order of 10−1 degrees. The same 
ground procedures cannot be applied for the radar: in this case 
ﬁne alignment with respect to the AHRS can be based on ﬂight 
data analysis. In particular, chasing phases can be effectively used 
thanks to the large number of intruder detections, smooth relative 
dynamics, and consequent small impact of latencies. However, im-
plementing these two separate procedures, based on ground and 
ﬂight data, can have some limitations for the estimation of rela-
tive alignment if a commercial MEMS-based AHRS, such as the one 
embarked on FLARE, is used. In fact, attitude measurement error in 
dynamic conditions differs from the one achievable in static condi-
tions. Besides attitude error noise, error biases (above all, heading 
error) can differ because of residual uncompensated magnetometer 
biases and onboard magnetic ﬁelds (due for example to engine op-
eration), which produce measurement errors depending on aircraft 
orientation in the Earth magnetic ﬁeld.
Thus, a ﬂight-based calibration procedure has been developed 
whose aim is to estimate with high accuracy the relative alignment between radar and EO cameras. In fact, a common alignment error 
of both radar and EO sensors with respect to AHRS does not impact 
signiﬁcantly collision avoidance capabilities, since it is equivalent 
to an error bias in attitude angles measurements and as such it 
does not affect computation of angular derivatives of intruder mo-
tion. On the other hand, relative misalignment has detrimental 
effects on collision detection capabilities since it generates mea-
surements with different biases, whose effects depend on the story 
of intruder detections and are thus unpredictable a priori. From a 
practical point of view, angular derivatives of intruder motion can 
be affected which are the most important variables for accurately 
estimating collision risk. The ﬂight-based alignment procedure can 
be carried out combining ownship and intruder navigation data, 
radar measurements, and optical images, as shown in the ﬂow 
chart depicted in Fig. 4.
A ﬂight segment has to be considered whose duration is of the 
order of some tens of seconds and which is characterized by chas-
ing ﬂight and no signiﬁcant variations of heading angle. Within 
this ﬂight segment, it is assumed that biases in attitude angles er-
rors are nearly constant, especially regarding the heading angle. 
This assumption can then be veriﬁed by the analysis of radar/op-
tical azimuth and elevation errors. The intruder has to be at a 
minimum distance of several hundreds of meters, so that GPS lin-
ear positioning uncertainty is mitigated in angular terms. Within 
this framework, uncertainty in reference GPS measurements can 
be lowered by exploiting satellite-based or ground-based augmen-
tation systems for the ownship and/or the intruder [36]. From a 
geometric point of view, it is preferable that scans/frames are pro-
cessed with the intruder lying in different areas of the sensor FOVs, 
in order to guarantee the same level of accuracy on all Euler an-
gles.
Radar and EO measurements refer to different times and direct 
measurement interpolation can introduce signiﬁcant additional er-
rors considering that measurements are generated in sensors’ ref-
erence frame and that measurement rate is low, especially for 
radar. However, the assumption of stationarity of attitude error bi-
ases allows indirect estimation of relative sensor alignment. In fact, 
radar and EO alignment matrices with respect to the AHRS can be 
calculated separately.
Considering for example the radar, ﬁrst of all, for each mea-
surement linear interpolation of GPS data (available at a frequency 
of 1 Hz) allows the intruder relative position vector in NED at the 
considered measurement instant to be found. Then, interpolation 
of attitude data (available at 10 Hz) and subsequent transformation 
by the aircraft attitude matrix gives the relative position vector in 
BRF. Let us call this vector riBRF , where the i index refers to the 
generic i-th measurement. Dividing by its modulus, it is possible 
to evaluate the cosine directors of the line-of-sight to the target 
relevant to the radar and the i-th measurement. Let us call rˆiBRF
the computed unit vector. Target position vector as given in radar 
output can be used ﬁrst of all to select echoes that can be asso-
ciated with very good conﬁdence to the intruder, i.e. echoes that 
have differences in range, azimuth and elevation below assigned 
thresholds. If this is the case, it is possible to deﬁne rˆ iRAD as the 
unit vector representing the direction to the target in the radar 
based reference frame relevant to the i-th scan (at most a single 
measurement can be associated to the intruder in each scan). It is 
then possible to deﬁne a loss function:
J (MRAD) =
n∑
i=1
wi |rˆiRAD − MRADrˆiBRF |2 (2)
where n is the number of collected measurements/positions, wi is 
the weight of the i-th measurement and MRAD is the alignment 
matrix of the radar with respect to the aircraft. The loss function 
is thus the weighted sum squared of the differences between the 
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that which minimizes J . It can be computed by means of the algo-
rithm named q-method which calculates attitude in terms of the 
corresponding optimal least-square quaternion [37]. The weights 
are linearly related to intruder range to take into account the vari-
able impact of GPS linear uncertainties on estimated angles.
A similar procedure can be used for the EO cameras, and in par-
ticular for the panchromatic one, in order to get a rotation matrix 
MCAM . In this case, supervised image analysis (or the obstacle de-
tection algorithm fed by GPS/AHRS cues) allows target center pixel 
to be identiﬁed in each image, which is then translated into angu-
lar information by exploiting the camera intrinsic parameters.
Once the two matrices are calculated, under the above men-
tioned assumption of stationary error biases relative alignment 
matrix can be obtained by a matrix product, i.e.
MRAD→CAM = MTRADMCAM (3)
Though the single unit vectors are affected by aircraft dynam-
ics and attitude error noises, the large number of samples available 
from ﬂight data can reduce the estimation uncertainty, while gen-
erating a robust estimation of relative sensors alignment.
4. Flight results
The sense and avoid ﬂight test campaign carried out within 
TECVOL project comprised several different tests. This paper deals 
with results from the obstacle tracking experiments (autonomous 
anti-collision logic not engaged) and aims at comparing standalone 
radar tracking with radar/EO tracking output. In particular, the 
comparison is carried out exploiting both ﬂight data and off-line 
simulations based on a software which faithfully replicates the 
real time tracking module. All ﬂight tests were carried out with 
a conﬁguration of test facilities comprising FLARE aircraft piloted 
by human pilot or by the autonomous ﬂight control system, a pi-
loted intruder VLA equipped with GPS, a Ground Control Station 
(GCS) for real-time ﬂight coordination and test monitoring, a full-
duplex data-link between FLARE and GCS, and a downlink between 
intruder and GCS. Two types of maneuvers were basically executed during ﬂight experiments, such as chasing tests with FLARE pursu-
ing the intruder (useful for ﬂight-based relative sensor alignment), 
and near collision encounters.
Flight results are presented as follows. First, ﬂight-based rela-
tive sensor alignment results are described which allow the multi-
sensor tracking algorithm to be properly tuned and thus to reach 
the best performance. Then, main aspects of detection performance 
by radar and EO camera are recalled, and tracking results are an-
alyzed. Finally, estimation of situational awareness is focused to 
better point out the performance increase due to data fusion, and 
the key points for fusion effectiveness.
4.1. Flight-based alignment
An example of ﬂight-based alignment is here reported consider-
ing a chasing ﬂight segment of about 80 s, with FLARE keeping an 
almost constant heading angle and intruder range increasing from 
700 m to about 2 km. While attitude measurement error biases are 
with good approximation constant, the duration of the considered 
ﬂight segment and the smooth relative dynamics allow having a 
signiﬁcant number of radar/optical detections to be exploited by 
the alignment algorithm.
For the sake of clarity, Fig. 5 reports intruder range as estimated 
from GPS data, and radar echoes in the considered ﬂight segment. 
A portion of a panchromatic image comprising the intruder (at a 
range of about 830 m) is also reported.
Extracting (by means of a supervised procedure) intruder pix-
els from images, individuating radar echoes due to the intruder, 
and applying the previously described alignment procedure leads 
to the “absolute” (i.e., with respect to the AHRS) and relative align-
ment angles reported in Table 1. The Euler angles are all relevant 
to a heading-pitch-roll sequence. It is worth underlining that abso-
lute alignment angles are not used by the tracking software (abso-
lute misalignment has no impact on collision detection capabilities 
and AHRS biases are variable in different ﬂight segments).
As a ﬁrst estimate of procedure uncertainty, Figs. 6 and 7 re-
port the angles between intruder unit vectors as measured from 
scans/images and the same vectors as generated from GPS/AHRS 
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range as estimated by GPS and by radar, (b) zoom of an image window enclosing 
the intruder aircraft at a range of about 830 m.
Table 1
Absolute and relative alignment angles estimated from ﬂight data.
Estimated angle 
(◦)
Radar w.r.t. 
BRF
Panchromatic 
camera w.r.t. 
BRF
Radar w.r.t.
panchromatic 
camera
Heading 0.32 1.19 −0.86
Pitch 0.49 0.64 −0.16
Roll −1.12 −0.51 −0.61
Fig. 6. Error angle between the intruder unit vector as measured from radar scans 
and the same vector as generated from GPS/AHRS data and estimated radar align-
ment matrix, for all the considered samples.
Fig. 7. Error angle between the intruder unit vector as measured from EO camera 
images and the same vector as generated from GPS/AHRS data and estimated cam-
era alignment matrix, for all the considered samples.
data and estimated (absolute) alignment matrices. It can be seen 
that no signiﬁcant systematic error trends can be identiﬁed in the 
diagrams. In both diagrams, the root mean square (rms) value of 
the angle over all the samples is also depicted. It can be seen that 
the value obtained from the radar is of the order of the beamwidth 
of its antenna main lobe, while in the case of the panchromatic 
camera the obtained rms angle is of the order of 0.1◦ , not signiﬁ-
cantly more than camera Instantaneous Field Of View (IFOV, about 
0.040◦), which conﬁrms the stability of attitude error biases during 
the processed ﬂight segment. As it will be evident from multi-
sensor fusion results too, this can also be assumed as the order of 
magnitude of the residual uncertainty in relative sensor alignment, 
enabling accurate registration of radar echoes and camera-based 
estimates.
4.2. Detection and tracking performance
The radar was conﬁrmed to be a reliable source of information 
with a detection range of about 3 km in different conditions (un-
ambiguous range was set to be 4 km in the considered tests) and a 
coarse angular accuracy of the order of its antenna main lobe, i.e. 
1.7◦ . A great amount of ground echoes were detected due to the 
limited ﬂight altitude (a few hundreds of meters), while the valid 
measurement rate was of less than 1 Hz on average [20].
Regarding obstacle detection by the EO camera in the integrated 
multi-sensor system, cross-sensor cueing plays a key role for re-
ducing performance sensitivity on environmental conditions and 
improving EO detection performance while keeping a small com-
putational burden. An example of the highly variable operating 
conditions for the EO system (in terms of background homogeneity 
and intruder appearance) is shown in Fig. 8 which depicts two im-
ages enclosing the intruder at a distance of about 1 km in different 
illumination conditions (sun in front at the limits of camera FOV, 
and sun in the back, in mean visibility conditions). The intruder 
aircraft is brighter than the background in one case, and darker in 
the other. In the sun-in-front case, main issues for correct intruder 
detection are relevant to sun glare effects and contrast reduction, 
while in the sun-in-the-back case they are related to the reduction 
of background homogeneity and to the presence of many small 
white clouds which can be erroneously taken as the intruder air-
craft. In fact, in spite of these challenging operating conditions, 
in mean visibility conditions image windowing and exploitation 
of range estimate enable reliable detection at a range larger than 
G. Fasano et al. / Aerospace Science and Technology 46 (2015) 436–450 443Fig. 8. Panchromatic images taken in different illumination conditions. The arrows point to the intruder aircraft, at a range of about 1 km in both cases.
Fig. 9. Range (GPS, multi-sensor tracker, radar-only tracker, and radar) and relative estimation error (multi-sensor tracker, radar-only tracker, and radar) as a function of GPS 
time in considered scenario.2 km for an ultralight aircraft [21]. In addition, false alarm rate 
is kept at a very small value by conservative tuning of the algo-
rithm. This is paid with a very slight increase of missed detection 
rate at large range, and the impact of the residual false positives is 
mitigated by the multi-sensor tracking architecture which foresees 
gating.
Regarding obstacle tracking performance, in general it depends 
on the considered relative dynamics scenario. From the application 
point of view, quasi-frontal near collision geometries are of course 
the most interesting ones. These geometries are characterized by 
fast relative dynamics and short time duration, and a few radar 
detections can be typically exploited for tracking, while EO data 
offer the potential of a signiﬁcant increase in measurement rate. 
Indeed, in the considered ﬂight tests EO data were acquired and 
processed at 3.3 Hz due to limitations on the mass memory of the 
image processing unit, thus radar/EO data fusion can be performed 
at this maximum frequency. In any case this constitutes a signiﬁ-
cant improvement compared with radar-only tracking, where valid 
intruder detections are received at a frequency of less than 1 Hz, 
on average.
In order to estimate tracking performance, GPS measurements 
(differential GPS for FLARE aircraft, standalone GPS for the intruder 
aircraft) are used as reference, and GPS time is used as reference time for synchronization. Azimuth, Elevation, Azimuth rate, and 
Elevation Rate estimates are all expressed in a stabilized NED refer-
ence frame with origin in FLARE center of mass. In this way, AHRS 
measurements of attitude angles and the relevant uncertainties are 
not used to compute reference values.
In what follows, a single near collision encounter is analyzed in 
detail. The considered scenario is characterized by a closing speed 
which increases in the very ﬁrst part of the encounter (when the 
two aircraft are smoothly maneuvering) until reaching an almost 
constant value of about 75 m/s, and a range of about 2.95 km at 
ﬁrst detection, corresponding to a time-to-CPA of about 45 s. Firm 
tracking phase is entered at a range of about 2.6 km. The illumi-
nation conditions are characterized by the presence of the sun in 
front of FLARE aircraft and by average visibility conditions. More-
over, the intruder ﬂies near the horizon line in the initial part of 
the considered encounter.
Outputs of tracking algorithm in single sensor and multi-sensor 
conﬁguration are presented in Figs. 9–14 which also report raw 
sensor outputs where applicable, GPS-based estimates, and sen-
sors/tracking errors. In these diagrams, radar echoes that can be 
associated with very good conﬁdence to the intruder (empty cir-
cles) are separated from clutter returns (ﬁlled points) by verifying 
that differences in range, azimuth and elevation with respect to 
444 G. Fasano et al. / Aerospace Science and Technology 46 (2015) 436–450Fig. 10. Stabilized azimuth (GPS, multi-sensor tracker, EO, radar-only tracker, and radar) and relative estimation error (multi-sensor tracker, EO, radar-only tracker, and radar) 
as a function of GPS time in considered scenario.
Fig. 11. Stabilized elevation (GPS, multi-sensor tracker, EO, radar-only tracker, and radar) and relative estimation error (multi-sensor tracker, EO, radar-only tracker, and radar) 
as a function of GPS time in considered scenario.GPS-based estimates fall below assigned thresholds. This is also 
required to carry out a quantitative analysis of radar accuracy.
As expected, the range estimates (Fig. 9) are not very much 
affected by EO measurements, with only some small effects due 
to the range-angles coupling introduced by the Cartesian dynamic 
model used in the tracking ﬁlter. The multi-sensor and the radar-only tracker outputs are very similar to each other, with an ac-
curacy of the order of a few meters which derives from the ﬁne 
radar range accuracy. Due to the limited ﬂight altitude, a signiﬁ-
cant number of ground echoes is detected (at negative elevation 
angles, as shown in Fig. 11), which are correctly removed in real 
time by the tracking algorithm on the basis of their estimated 
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considered scenario.
Fig. 13. Stabilized azimuth rate (GPS, multi-sensor tracker, and radar-only tracker) and relative estimation error (multi-sensor tracker and radar-only tracker) as a function of 
GPS time in considered scenario.range and altitude [20], and have no effects on tracking perfor-
mance.
The diagrams relevant to angular estimates (Figs. 10 and 11) 
show signiﬁcant differences between the multi-sensor and the sin-
gle sensor tracker, and offer several discussion points.
First of all, a signiﬁcant number of valid measurements is pro-
vided by the EO system and used by the tracking algorithm in 
the multi-sensor case, in spite of the limited frame rate and the 
challenging illumination conditions, with a single larger error esti-
mate (GPS time of day of about 52 012 s) which represents a false 
positive. Both radar and EO measurement errors show signiﬁcant 
biases in azimuth (about −2.2◦) and in elevation (about −0.6◦), which are with good approximation constant during the consid-
ered encounter. In the elevation case, this is due to the residual 
misalignment between AHRS and obstacle detection sensors. In 
the azimuth case, the phenomenon is due to the combination of 
residual misalignment and the bias in estimation of aircraft head-
ing angle, which depends on vehicle orientation in Earth magnetic 
ﬁeld and in general is due to several issues, such as:
– magnetometers sensitivity and calibration residual inaccura-
cies;
– uncertainties in modeling Earth magnetic ﬁeld;
– residual uncompensated magnetic ﬁelds.
446 G. Fasano et al. / Aerospace Science and Technology 46 (2015) 436–450Fig. 14. Stabilized elevation rate (GPS, multi-sensor tracker, and radar-only tracker) and relative estimation error (multi-sensor tracker and radar-only tracker) as a function 
of GPS time in considered scenario.As stated above, no AHRS-radar and AHRS-camera alignment 
corrections are applied within the multi-sensor tracking algorithm, 
which is due to the fact that these biases are constant (elevation) 
or variable (thus not removable in ﬂight) but slowly time varying 
in each ﬂight segment (azimuth), with little or no consequences 
on intruder velocity predictions and collision avoidance safety.
Instead, it is important to underline that radar and EO biases 
are the same both in azimuth and in elevation, within an approxi-
mation of about 0.1◦ . This conﬁrms that quality of relative sensors 
alignment is very high with a residual uncertainty of that order 
of magnitude. Furthermore, image timing accuracy, and more in 
general time registration errors, are conﬁrmed not to affect system 
performance at a signiﬁcant level, though FLARE, being a small air-
craft, exhibits a very “noisy” attitude dynamics also due to lateral 
directional ﬂight dynamics modes excited by radar inertia and me-
chanical scanning operation.
Comparison of raw sensor measurements allows pointing out 
the different performance level of radar and camera both in terms 
of error standard deviation (of the order of 1◦ for the radar, 0.15◦
for the camera) and valid measurement rate (on average after the 
ﬁrst detections, about 0.7 Hz for the radar, about 2.6 Hz for the 
camera). Regarding angular error noise in NED, it is interesting to 
note that, consistently with the results of ﬂight based alignment, 
camera accuracy is not degraded at a signiﬁcant level compared 
with its IFOV, though a commercial MEMS-based AHRS system is 
used.
Considering now the outputs of the tracking algorithm, both 
in azimuth and in elevation there is a great difference between 
the radar-only and the multi-sensor tracker, and the impact of 
radar/EO fusion on performance is dramatic: in the multi-sensor 
case, while accuracy is signiﬁcantly increased, almost achieving at 
a frequency of 10 Hz the order of magnitude of EO angular er-
rors (error standard deviation is of about 0.3◦), tracking outputs 
also gain a great advantage from EO measurement rate generat-
ing smoother estimates. It can also be appreciated that the single 
false positive provided by the image processing system does not 
negatively impact performance, since it falls outside track gate and 
thus is discarded in track ﬁltering phase. On the other hand, radar-based tracking outputs are reliable but in terms of accuracy they 
suffer from both rough angular error and low valid measurement 
rate. In this case, error noise is of about 0.9◦ both in azimuth and 
in elevation, about three times the accuracy of multi-sensor-based 
estimates. As expected, both tracking algorithms generate biased 
outputs which directly derive from raw measurements biases. As 
a ﬁnal remark to the angle diagrams, both for raw measurements 
and for tracking outputs a somewhat larger angular error can be 
individuated in the very last instants before encounter, especially 
in the elevation case because of the encounter geometry with al-
most zero lateral separation. Nevertheless, this corresponds to a 
very small positioning error and is due to the fact GPS is not a 
very accurate reference at very small ranges due to the impact of 
residual time synchronization and linear positioning uncertainties.
Analysis of the derivatives gives further insight into tracking be-
havior. Depending on range accuracy, tracking error in range rate 
(Fig. 12) is of the order of 1 m/s during the whole encounter for 
both the radar-only and the multi-sensor tracker, with no signiﬁ-
cant impact of radar/EO fusion. Also considering that no signiﬁcant 
error biases are exhibited, this performance level largely suﬃces 
for the needs of collision detection and avoidance.
In view of collision detection performance, angular rates
(Figs. 13 and 14) are the key variables which gain advantage from 
data fusion. In both the radar-only and the multi-sensor case, as a 
consequence of constant angle error biases, azimuth and elevation 
rates are with good approximation unbiased, a general result that 
was experienced in the whole ﬂight test campaign. However, in 
the multi-sensor case, the increase of accuracy and measurement 
rate brought by EO detections optimally integrates radar-based 
information and allows the tracking algorithm to signiﬁcantly im-
prove angular rate performance, so that the azimuth rate and the 
elevation rate errors fall below 0.1◦/s for almost the whole en-
counter duration, with the exception of the very last instants as 
explained above. Compared with average radar-only tracking accu-
racy (root mean square error of about 0.3◦/s both in azimuth and 
in elevation), as in the angular case this represents a reduction by 
two-thirds of the error, which is achieved in spite of the limita-
tions of the experimental setup such as limited frame rate. In fact, 
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Statistics of sensors and trackers errors in the considered frontal encounter.
Range 
(m)
Azimuth (NED) 
(◦)
Elevation (NED) 
(◦)
Range rate 
(m/s)
Azimuth rate (NED) 
(◦/s)
Elevation rate (NED) 
(◦/s)
Radar mean (<1 Hz) 1.9 −2.3 −0.50 N/A N/A N/A
Electro-optical mean (<3 Hz) N/A −2.3 −0.60 N/A N/A N/A
Radar-only tracker mean (10 Hz) 3.8 −2.3 −0.52 −0.064 0.037 −0.035
Multi-sensor tracker mean (10 Hz) 3.6 −2.2 −0.60 0.41 0.029 −0.035
Radar std (<1 Hz) 2.5 0.86 1.0 N/A N/A N/A
Electro-optical std (<3 Hz) N/A 0.10 0.18 N/A N/A N/A
Radar-only tracker std (10 Hz) 3.9 0.88 0.92 1.6 0.29 0.26
Multi-sensor tracker std (10 Hz) 3.6 0.31 0.26 1.6 0.099 0.092an even more signiﬁcant tracking performance improvement could 
be expected for the given camera angular resolution by exploiting 
a larger frame rate.
To summarize the results of the analysis, statistics of sensors 
and tracking errors (mean and standard deviation) are reported in 
Table 2. In order to limit the effect of linear GPS and data synchro-
nization errors when transformed into angular uncertainties, these 
statistics have been evaluated considering only the ﬂight segment 
when the range between the two aircraft is larger than 350 m. 
Statistics relevant to the multi-sensor tracking scenario also com-
prise the very ﬁrst part of the encounter, when tracking output 
is based only on radar measurements. However, both error mean 
and standard deviation for the multi-sensor tracker are close to EO 
statistics, also as a consequence of the larger weight that EKF gives 
to optical measurements. As also noted in previous analyses [20], 
the tracker exhibits in range slightly larger uncertainties than the 
radar because of the impact of the slow measurement rate given 
the assigned ﬂight geometry. These statistics conﬁrm that data fu-
sion combines in an optimal fashion the different sources, keeping 
practically the same range and range-rate accuracy of radar-based 
tracking while enabling a substantial improvement of angular and 
angular rate estimates.
4.3. Estimation of situational awareness
In order to focus the impact of this performance improvement 
for autonomous sense and avoid, it is worth recalling that non-
cooperative obstacle detection and tracking are basically needed 
for collision detection, and for keeping situational awareness dur-
ing (at least part of) the avoidance maneuver. Within this frame-
work, the two main quantities of interest are the time to closest 
point of approach (tCPA), also named time-to-go in literature, and 
the distance at closest point of approach (dCPA), which is the basic 
variable for estimating collision risk [14] and can be evaluated in 
vectorial form on the basis of the knowledge of intruder relative 
position and velocity thanks to the equation
dCPA = r ·
V
‖ V ‖2
V −r = tCPA V −r (4)
where r is the relative position vector and V is the velocity vector 
of the UAS with respect to the intruder.
In the considered ﬂight scenario, dCPA computed on the basis of 
GPS measurements can be used as a reference for comparing the 
distance at CPA estimated by the radar-based and the multi-sensor 
tracker. This is shown in Fig. 15 that reports these estimates as 
a function of time until the actual closest point of approach, cor-
responding to a few tens of meters (and thus representing a real 
near mid air collision scenario).
Before discussing these results, it is useful to focus dCPA sensi-
tivity to angular rate errors. In near collision conditions, angular 
derivatives are the most important variables for collision risk esti-
mation, since estimation errors correspond to erroneous rotations 
of the predicted relative velocity vector (indeed, a collision threat can be detected in absence of range information, given that angu-
lar rates are null and range rate is negative [11]). As an example, to 
estimate only the effect of an azimuth rate error εϕ˙ on dCPA in near 
collision conditions, we can consider a simpliﬁed two-dimensional 
geometry with a frontal collision geometry and a given range rate 
[20], thus deriving
εdCPA,ϕ˙ = r sin
(
tan−1
(
rεϕ˙
|r˙|
))
≈ tCPArεϕ˙ (5)
In the same way, an elevation rate error εϑ˙ in near collision 
conditions gives
εdCPA,ϑ˙ = r sin
(
tan−1
(
rεϑ˙
|r˙|
))
≈ tCPArεϑ˙ (6)
At a ﬁrst level of approximation, the dCPA uncertainty due to 
the combination of the two angular rate errors can be evaluated 
assuming uncorrelated estimates as:
εdCPA =
√
ε2dCPA,ϕ˙ + ε2dCPA,ϑ˙ ≈
r2
|r˙|
√
ε2ϕ˙ + ε2ϑ˙ ≈ tCPAr
√
ε2ϕ˙ + ε2ϑ˙ (7)
Root mean square (rms) values of azimuth and elevation rate 
errors as estimated in radar-only and multi-sensor conﬁguration, 
and GPS-based range and range rate measurements in the consid-
ered encounter, can be used within Equations (5)–(7) to derive 
uncertainty trends for dCPA . Since mean angular rate errors are 
with good approximation null, rms values practically coincide with 
error standard deviations reported in Table 2. It is interesting to 
underline that, for constant range rate (typical near collision ge-
ometries) and given angular uncertainties (ﬁrm tracking phase for 
a given sensors/algorithms combination), equation (7) indicates a 
quadratic decrease of εdCPA with time, since range decreases lin-
early with time.
For the sake of clarity, radar and multi-sensor tracking un-
certainties have been summed and subtracted to the reference 
dCPA trend computed from GPS to obtain the diagrams depicted 
in Fig. 15, which also reports tCPA as estimated by GPS and by the 
two tracking algorithms. Uncertainty envelopes are depicted only 
for positive values since dCPA by deﬁnition cannot be a negative 
quantity.
While tCPA is estimated accurately by both trackers (rms differ-
ence with respect to reference 0.34 s for multi-sensor and 0.41 s 
for radar-only tracker) as a consequence of ﬁne radar range ac-
curacy, the difference in dCPA diagrams clariﬁes the remarkable 
increase in the level of situational awareness that is achieved in 
multiple sensor conﬁguration. In fact, both trackers demonstrate a 
reliable behavior though the reference dCPA is not constant, demon-
strating as anticipated above that the two aircraft are smoothly 
maneuvering especially in the ﬁrst part of the collision scenario. 
However, soon after the ﬁrst EO detection (at a relatively large 
range, corresponding to a time to collision of about 30 s) and for 
the whole encounter duration, the angular rate estimates by the 
multi-sensor tracker enable a very accurate dCPA estimation. On the 
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for some instants, its worse angular rate performance then leads 
to larger dCPA error for more than 10 seconds, corresponding to a 
clearly worse collision detection performance. The phenomenon is 
mitigated only in the last seconds before closest point of approach, 
because the relatively small values of range and time to collision 
reduce the impact of angular rate errors.
Within the variability of experimental conditions, Fig. 15 shows 
that tracking outputs are very well contained in the envelopes de-
ﬁned by the uncertainty trends based on equations (5)–(7). While 
conﬁrming the consistency of the simpliﬁed model, this further 
clariﬁes how the reduction by two thirds of the angular rate er-
rors is the real key for improving accuracy in dCPA estimation and 
thus collision detection performance. This conclusion holds in a 
general case: especially at large ranges, collision detection can be 
carried out with a satisfying trade-off between missed detection 
rates and false alarm rates by exploiting highly accurate angular 
rate estimates, which can only result from high resolution sensors, 
since these derivatives are indirectly estimated by the tracking al-
gorithm.
5. Conclusions
This paper focused on algorithms and ﬂight performance of 
radar/EO data fusion for non-cooperative UAS collision avoidance. 
Flight results were analyzed in detail and allow derivation of sev-
eral lessons learned, beyond the aspects related to technology 
demonstration.
In spite of some experimental limitations, such as limited cam-
era frame rate, data fusion is conﬁrmed to provide a remarkable 
improvement of situational awareness compared with standalone 
radar tracking, while keeping the same reliability and avoiding 
false tracks and mis-association phenomena. In particular, while 
range and range rate performance is of the same order of mag-
nitude of radar-based architectures, optimal integration of optical 
measurements enables a reduction by two thirds of error standard deviation in azimuth and elevation angles, attaining up to about 
0.3◦ , and a similar reduction in the root mean square error in an-
gular derivatives, up to about 0.1◦/s. The change in angular rate 
performance corresponds to a signiﬁcant accuracy improvement 
in the estimate of distance at closest point of approach, which is 
the basic variable used in collision detection logics. Indeed, larger 
frame rates would bring an even more signiﬁcant performance in-
crease, for the considered sensors. In general, both data rate and 
angular uncertainty of optical sensors are key factors to enhance 
tracking performance. In addition, increasing measurement rate is 
also important to ensure track continuity in case of intruder ma-
neuvers, without needing a very conservative tuning of the track-
ing ﬁlter (large process noise) which would increase the risk of 
erroneous data association due to the generation of large track gat-
ing volumes.
Furthermore, though a multi-sensor architecture is more com-
plex than a single sensor solution, ﬂight experiments demonstrate 
that radar/EO fusion can be carried out with a relatively limited 
computational effort, and adopting commercial sensors and pro-
cessing units.
Achieved results also conﬁrm that data fusion effectiveness goes 
beyond the increase of tracking accuracy: exploitation of multi-
sensor-based information within image processing algorithms for 
obstacle detection can signiﬁcantly reduce false alarm rate, detec-
tion range sensitivity to weather and illumination conditions, and 
computational burden, which are all known issues of standalone 
EO systems. Thus, cross-sensor cueing represents a key factor to 
fully exploit the potential of multi-sensor architectures. Indeed, in-
creasing detection range of optical sensors means reducing angular 
rate uncertainty at larger range (and time to collision) with a sig-
niﬁcant impact on collision detection performance because of the 
quadratic dependence of the uncertainty in estimated distance at 
closest point of approach on range in near collision geometries. 
Angular resolution is the main factor inﬂuencing detection range 
for given obstacle dimensions. Within this framework, multi-sensor 
architectures comprising cross-sensor cueing approaches provide a 
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tum eﬃciency cameras, also from the point of view of computa-
tional resources needed for monitoring a wide ﬁeld of regard.
Obstacle detection sensors misalignment with respect to the 
AHRS-deﬁned aircraft body reference frame, and biases in attitude 
measurement errors, do not have a signiﬁcant impact on sense and 
avoid performance, which depends on the accuracy in predicting 
minimum separation in the future, more than on the instantaneous 
intruder position uncertainty. On the other hand, relative sensors 
alignment and accurate time registration represent key factors for 
fusion effectiveness.
Within multi-sensor systems aimed at an angular accuracy of 
the order of 0.1◦ , tracking performance depends on the ownship 
navigation unit even more than in single sensor architectures with 
coarse angular accuracy. First, attitude measurement error noise 
can worsen raw detection accuracy thus greatly reducing or even 
nullifying the advantage of integrating high resolution sensors. 
Then, instability of error biases can affect relative alignment accu-
racy if a ﬂight-based procedure is implemented. Finally, regardless 
of sensors alignment, the same instability can affect angular rate 
performance by generating erroneous rate estimates, with conse-
quent loss of data fusion advantage from the point of view of 
situational awareness. As an example, a fast change in heading er-
ror bias would result, at tracking level, in an erroneous azimuth 
rate estimate. Within this framework, it is interesting to underline 
that adoption of latest generation MEMS-based sensors has shown 
to be compatible with the above mentioned angular accuracy lev-
els. This can be important in view of the adoption of data fusion 
approaches onboard UAS smaller than medium altitude long en-
durance (MALE) or high altitude long endurance (HALE) systems, 
which are usually equipped with tactical navigation units based on 
ring laser gyro technology. Miniaturization of airborne radar sen-
sors could be a further driver in this direction.
Achieved results pave the way for two ﬁnal considerations. On 
one hand, using current generation sensors, data fusion can fulﬁll 
safety requirements which would not be satisﬁed by single sen-
sor architectures. More importantly, a multi-sensor-based approach 
can allow facing in a more effective and less expensive way the 
trade-offs relevant to design of new sensors for non-cooperative
sense and avoid, since different sensors can be optimized in view 
of speciﬁc requirements
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